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ABSTRACT 
Little is known about the search strategy that employers use in their 
efforts to fill job vacancies. In this paper we analyse unique micro data to 
study this search strategy. We conclude that almost all vacancies are filled 
from a pool of applicants that is formed shortly after the posting of the 
vacancy. Hence, vacancy durations should be interpreted as selection periods 
and not as search periods for applicants. 
Key words: Vacancies, employer search, vacancy duration. 
JEL classification: 810, 210. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past decade economists have made considerable progress in the 
study of unemployment durations. Firstly, search theory which has its roots 
in the 60's (Stigler (1961)) was developed into a coherent theoretical 
framework for models of unemployment spells . Secondly, the introduction 
of hazard models provided economists with the statistical tools that were 
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needed to answer important questions conceming unemployment durations . 
These developments are closely related. On the one hand, job search theory 
predicts how the re-employment probability of an unemployed worker is 
affected by the constraints that he or she faces, e.g. the offer arrival 
rate, the wage offer distribution, the level of unemployment benefits, the 
(dis)utility of unemployment. On the other hand, hazard models of 
unemployment durations specify how the re-employment probability depends on 
characteristics of the unemployed worker and his/her environment and on the 
elapsed duration of unemployment. Ideally, an empirical hazard 
specification should be derived from a job search model. Usually empirical 
hazard models do not incorporate all the restrictions implied by job search 
theory , but even reduced form hazard models are interpreted in the 
context of job search theory. Building realistic empirical models of job 
search which incorporate the restrictions of job search theory, and which 
allow for a direct test of this theory is still a major challenge. 
The progress in the study of job search by the unemployed has not been 
matched by progress in the study of the search for employees by employers. 
This is unfortunate, because the performance of the labor market as 
measured by the rate at which matches between job seekers and searching 
employers are formed, can only be evaluated by considering both 
unemployment and vacancy durations (Jackman, Layard and Pissarides (1989) 
and Blanchard and Diamond (1989)). Af ter the pioneer ing study by Holt and 
David (1966) surprisingly little work has been done on employer search. 
Barron and Bishop (1985) and Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg (1985) study 
employer search by relating the number of applicants or interviews per 
employment offer and the time spent on recruiting and screening per 
applicant or per interview to characteristics of the vacancy and the 
employer. Their work can be seen as a direct study of various measures of 
the search intensity with which employers look for a suitable employee. 
They are silent on the outcome of the search effort, i.e. they do not study 
how long it takes to find a suitable employee and what are his or her 
characteristics. Beaumont (1978), Roper (1988), Renes (1989) and van Ours 
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(1989) study vacancy durations, i.e. they only consider the outcome of 
the search effort of the employers. They relate the vacancy duration to 
various characteristics of the vacancy and the employer. Renes and van Ours 
who use hazard models also address the question how the rate at which 
vacancies are filled depends on the elapsed duration of the vacancy. 
In this paper we shall use data on vacancy durations and the number of 
applicants to study the search strategy of employers. By combining these 
data we are able to separately identify the arrival rate of applicants and 
the acceptance probability of these applicants. We shall test whether the 
sequential search model that has been the dominant model for search by the 
unemployed, is an appropriate model for the recruitment behavior of 
employers. In the sequential search model applicants arrive sequentially at 
the firm and are accepted or rejected upon arrival. Such a model for 
employer search has been proposed by Lippman and McCall (1976) and other 
authors. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss models of 
employer search and compare them with models of search by the unemployed. 
In section 3 we introducé a model for the joint determination of vacancy 
durations and numbers of applicants. Section 4 describes the data, and the 
estimation results are in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Vacancies and Employer Search 
Firms have vacancies because it takes time to find a suitable employee 
for a specific job. Jobs usually require specific skills, and only some job 
seekers may have these skills. Moreover employers may need formal or 
informal tests to assess whether an applicant has the required skills. It 
takes time to attract applicants and to decide whether they are suitable. 
In most surveys a vacancy is defined as a slot that an employer would like 
to fill immediately. This implies that employers do not have perfect 
control over the hiring of new employees. They are faced with uncertainty 
over the time at which a suitable applicant can be hired, and over the 
characteristics of the new employee. 
Of course, an employer can take measures to reduce this uncertainty. 
Most jobs have periods of notice which allow the employer to start 
searching and hiring before the present employee has left. This strategy is 
not very successful. In January 1988 68% of all vacancies in the 
Netherlands referred to unoccupied jobs (Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Vacancy Survey 1988) . There may be a good reason for this. Advance hiring 
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of employees involves paying doublé wages, and this is an expensive way to 
avoid the costs of an unoccupied position. Advertising and using the 
services of a personnel department are other means to reduce the 
uncertainty regarding the time of hiring and the skills of the new 
employee. These efforts are quite effective. In the 80's the vacancy rate, 
i.e. the ratio of the number of vacancies to the number of employees, in 
the Netherlands varied between 0.4% in 1982 and 1.6% in 1988. In the same 
period the average complete vacancy duration varied between 2.1 months in 
1980 and 0.9 months in 1983 (1988, 1.3 months)6). Hence, even if the 
employers have not full control over the time of hiring, they do not miss 
many employees due to vacancies, and new employees are not hired much later 
than planned. This does not mean that vacancies are uncommon: the number of 
vacancies generated in a year varied between 15% of the employed in 1987 
and 5% in 1982. Hence, most jobs are presumably filled after a vacancy, 
i.e. at a later date than planned. 
In the extensive literature on job search by the unemployed it is 
usually assumed that the unemployed use a sequential search strategy. Job 
offers arrive (or are discovered) according to a point process, e.g. a 
Poisson process. A job offer is a draw from a wage offer distribution. Upon 
arrival of the job offer the unemployed individual has to decide whether to 
accept the job or not. The optimal decision strategy maximizes the 
searcher's expected discounted utility stream. The optimal strategy depends 
on knowledge of the wage offer distribution and the arrival rate of jobs, 
the (non-)stationarity of the search environment, the form of the utility 
function, the possibility of recall (or not), and the time-horizon of the 
searcher. Under certain assumptions (e.g. known arrival rate and wage offer 
distribution, monotonie, additive utility, no recall, and infinite 
time-horizon) the optimal search strategy is characterized by a reservation 
wage. This reservation wage depends on the arrival rate, the search costs, 
and the parameters of the wage offer distribution. The probability that a 
randomly chosen job offer is acceptable depends on the same variables. 
The probability that an unemployed job seeker finds a job in some 
small time interval, given that he or she is still unemployed at the start 
of that interval, i.e. the hazard rate of leaving unemployment (for a job), 
is equal to the product of the arrival rate of job offers and the 
acceptance probability. 
We can build a similar model for search by employers, and indeed 
Lippman and McCall (1976, p.182) present such a model. A more sophisticated 
version of their Elementary Employer Search Model could be as follows. 
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Applicants arrive according to a Poisson process at a firm. The firm 
sereens these applicants in order to assess their likely contribution to 
the firm's profits. Screening involves costs. There may also be costs if 
the vacancy refers to an unoccupied job. The firm knows the arrival rate of 
applicants (but not their time of arrival) and the distribution of 
characteristics of potential applicants. The productivity of applicants is 
not directly observable. Instead the firm may use observable 
characteristics as age, work experience and educational level as screening 
devices, possibly supplemented by further tests to assess the productive 
capacity of the applicant. The optimal strategy, i.e. the strategy that 
maximizes the expected present value of the flow of profits, specifies a 
reservation productivity or reservation values of observed productivity 
related characteristics, i.e. job requirements. These job requirements may 
also reflect the different productive skills required for heterogeneous 
jobs. In a companion paper (van Ours and Ridder (1990)) we analyze job 
requirements and their evolution over the duration of the vacancy. 
In the sequential employer search model the hazard rate of filling a 
vacancy is equal to the product of the arrival rate of applicants and the 
probability that an applicant is acceptable. In our empirical work we shall 
use data on the number of applicants and the vacancy duration to identify 
both factors. The reservation wage (and hence the accepttance probability) 
depends on the arrival rate of offers: if the arrival rate increases, then 
the reservation wage also increases and the acceptance probability 
decreases. The effect of an increase in the arrival rate on the hazard rate 
can be either positive or negative . 
The results of our analysis are not compatible with the sequential 
search model. Instead they indicate that employer search is non-sequential. 
Almost all applicants arrive in a short period just after the vacancy has 
been announced. Hence the firm seems to generate a large number of 
applicants early on in the vacancy duration. This is most likely the result 
of advertising the vacancy in one or more newspapers (69% of all vacancies 
are advertised, and 80% of these advertised vacancies are only advertised 
once) or notifying the labor exchange or an employment agency. There are 
good reasons why employers prefer this strategy. It is well-known that a 
compound strategy in which the searcher can generate more than one offer at 
some extra cost, usually dominates a sequential strategy where offers come 
one at a time (see Gal, Landsberger and Levykson (1981) and Morgan (1983)). 
Hence advertising and screening the resulting pool of applicants is 
preferred over sequential seach. Our results show that employers indeed use 
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this compound search strategy. 
3. A Statistical Model of Vacancy Durations and the Number of Applicants 
To study the recruitment strategy of employers we use data on the 
duration of a vacancy and the number of applicants that contacted the firm 
during this period. Hence we need the joint distribution of these random 
variables. We shall derive the model on the assumption of sequential 
search. However, if the true search strategy is non-sequential, the data 
are still compatible with a special case of our model. Hence, our model can 
be used to test whether employers use a sequential or a non-sequential 
strategy. We assume that applicants arrive at the firm according to a 
time-inhomogeneous Poisson process with arrival rate m(t). On arrival these 
applicants are tested by the firm, and immediately accepted or rejected. 
The probability that an applicant is suitable and is hired by the firm is 
equal to P(t). Thus the arrival rate of unsuitable applicants is equal to 
ïïig(t)=m(t)(l-P(t)), and the arrival rate of suitable applicants, i.e. the 
rate at which the vacancy is filled or the hazard of filling the vacancy, 
is mj4(t)=ö(t)=m(t)P(t). The joint density of a vacancy duration t and 
N(t)=n rejected applicants at t is equal to 
(3.1) f(n,t) = 0(t)exp{-f ö ( s )ds} .exp{-M J ? ( t )} i^4T^ > n=0,l,... 
o 
with 
(3.2) Mtf(t) = ƒ
 mif(s)ds 
o 
The density in (3.1) is written as the product of the marginal density of t 
and the conditional density of N(t) given the vacancy duration. Although 
this joint density is derived on the assumption of sequential search by the 
employers, we shall argue below that non-sequential search can be seen as a 
limiting case of this model. 
The density in (3.1) is appropriate for the study of a cohort of 
vacancies. However, our data are obtained by sampling the stock of 
vacancies at a particular point in time. It is well-known (e.g. Ridder 
(1984)) that using density (3.1) in the analysis of stock data yields 
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biased estimates, e.g. the average vacancy duration is larger in the stock 
than in the cohort. The appropriate density for the analysis of durations 
drawn from the stock takes account of the overrepresentation of long 
durations in the stock. 
Let us distinguish between calendar time r and duration time t. Hence, 
if a vacancy that was posted at time r has lasted a period t, then the 
calendar time is r+t. The rate at which vacancies are announced is denoted 
by q(r). This rate will vary with the calendar time. It is convenient to 
put the time-origin at the date that the stock was sampled. A vacancy can 
be included in the sample if was announced at some date - t and has lasted 
for at least a period t, i.e. if it still exists at the date of sampling. 
Hence, the density of an incomplete vacancy duration tx at time 0 is 
q(-tl)exp{-}19(s)ds} 
(3.3) g ^ ) =
 ;  
| q ( - t ) e x p { - p ( s ) d s } d t 
The sample is not drawn from the stock of vacancies, but from the stock of 
firms. Only those firms were included that had a vacancy at the date of 
sampling. We can analyse this sample as a sample from the stock of 
vacancies, if we assume that vacancies are announced and filled 
independently of each other, i.e. there are no unobserved employer specific 
effects. In (3.3) we assume implicitly that the hazard 6 does not depend on 
calendar time. 
The joint density of the incomplete vacancy duration and the number of 
applicants at the date of interview is 
(3.5) g2(tl5n) = g 1 ( t 1 ) . e x p { - M j ; ( t 1 ) } i ^ ( ^ ) ) n , n=0,l,... 
The firms that provided information in November-December 1986 were 
approached for a second interview af ter about 4 months. From this second 
interview we know whether the vacancy was filled in these 4 months and if 
so, when the vacancy was filled. If the date at which the vacancy was 
filled is given by t2 (after a duration tx+t2), then it is easily seen that 
t i + t 2 
(3.6) g3(t2 | t1 ,n) = 0(t1+t2)exp{ -ƒ 0(s)ds} 
H 
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Hence, the joint density of t l5 t2 and N(tx) is given by the product of 
(3.6) and (3.5). 
4. The Data 
The data were obtained by a stratified (by economie activity and 
number of employees) 5% random sample of all establishments in the 
Netherlands. Establishments with fewer than 10 employees were excluded, as 
were government agencies, educational institutions and employment agencies. 
The original sample of 2522 establishments resulted in a net sample of 1913 
establishments who were willing to provide the relevant information. About 
a third (648) of these had one or more vacancies. Vacancies usually refer 
to job titles and not to individual jobs, e.g. a firm may have 4 vacancies 
(jobs) for computer operators (job title). In the questionnaire the 
vacancies were grouped by job title, i.e. we know the number of vacancies 
for that particular job title, but nothing about individual vacancies. This 
is appropriate for most purposes. However, as a consequence we do not know 
the incomplete vacancy duration if there is more than one vacancy for a 
particular job title. For this reason we exclude job titles with multiple 
vacancies. Depending on the number of job titles with vacancies the 
relevant information was gathered by telephone or by an interviewer who 
visited the establishment. This caused some additional non-response (68). 
All interviews were conducted in November-January 1986-1987. 
The 580 establishments that cooperated in the first survey were 
approached again in March-April 1987. Ahnost all (550) establishments also 
participated in the second survey. In this second survey data were 
collected on the date at which vacancies were filled (if they were filled) 
and on the characteristics of the individuals who were hired. In the second 
survey the information was collected by vacancy and not by job title. At 
the time of the second survey 2547 of the 3608 vacancies in the first 
survey (71%) were filled. 
For the reasons given above we have omitted all multiple vacancies. 
Our subsample consists of 670 vacancies. Of these 494 (74%) were filled at 
the time of the second survey. In Table 4.1 we give some characteristics of 
the vacancies in our sample. If we compare the sample means in Table 4.1 
with those of a subsample of 1850 vacancies for which we have complete and 
reliable information, we find that our subsample contains more commercial 
and fewer industry jobs and that fewer vacancies are posted at the labor 
exchange. These differences are due to the elimination of all multiple 
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vacancies. 
5. Estimation results 
5.1 Reduced form analysis 
As a first step we estimate a reduced form model for vacancy 
durations. In a reduced form model we do not attempt to identify the 
arrival rate and the acceptance probability. Instead we use a proportional 
hazard model for the hazard of the vacancy duration distribution. The 
hazard is specified as 
7 
(5.1) ö(t |x,v) = exp{/8'x+k£AfcIfc(t)+v} 
In (5.1) time is measured in weeks, and Ifc(t), k=l,...,7 are time-varying 
dummy variables which are 1 in the time intervals 2-4 weeks, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 
4-5, 5-6, 6+ months respectively. Hence, we have a flexible, piecewise 
constant hazard. The heterogeneity component v follows a discrete 
distribution with two points of support: 
h(vx) = p 
(5.2) 
h(v2)= 1-p 
The points of support and the probability p are parameters to be estimated. 
We have to choose a particular normalization of the proportional hazard 
model in (5.1). We set the constant in (5.1) equal to 0. Moreover, we 
estimate vx and v2~vi a n ( l we reparameterize p as exp{y}/(l+exp{y}). 
The parameters of the model, /3,A1,...,A8,v1,v2-v1,7' are estimated by 
maximum likelihood. In constructing the likelihood function we use the 
conditional distribution of the residual vacancy duration t2 given the 
incomplete duration t1} i.e. we use the conditional density in (3.6). An 
advantage of this conditional likelihood is that we only use the residual 
vacancy duration, which is likely to be more accurate than the incomplete 
vacancy duration. Moreover, by conditioning we eliminate the unknown entry 
rate q(r). However, conditioning changes the heterogeneity distribution 
(5.2). It is intuitively clear that vacancies which have been open for a 
long time at the time of the first interview have on average a smaller v 
10 
than vacancies which were posted just before the time of the first 
interview. We can formalize this intuition by deriving the conditional 
density of v given tx 
e x p { - 0 ( t 1 | x ) v J } p i 
(5.3) h ^ - l ^ x ) = - - j=l,2 
kr iexp{-6>(t 1 |x)v f c}p j f c 
with Px=p, p 2 =l-p , and 
(5.4) ©( t jx ) = | 0 ( s | x ) d s 
Hence, we have 
2 
(5.5) g(t2 | t1 ,x) = ^ ^ ( ^ I t ^ x ^ f c ^ V f c l t ^ x ) 
There is one further complication. For some vacancies that were filled at 
the time of the second interview the exact date at which the vacancy was 
filled is not known. Hence, the likelihood contribution of a vacancy can 
take one of triree forms: 
g(t2 | t1 ,x) if the vacancy is filled at a known date t2 
oo 
ƒ g(s|t l5x)ds if the vacancy is open at T2, the date of the 
T 2 
second interview 
T 2 
ƒ g(s|t l5x)ds if the vacancy is filled between 0 and T2 
o 
The results are given in Table 5.1. Note that few regression 
coefficients are significant. Vacancies for commercial jobs are filled more 
easily than other vacancies. A higher level of education reduces the 
hazard. If the vacancy requires more experience it is filled at a slower 
rate. 
Could these results be expected ? It is difficult to give a priori 
expectations of the signs of these coefficients. One can hypothesize that 
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employers try to control the duration of a vacancy and as a consequence 
will be choosy in filling a vacancy for which they expect many applicants. 
The opposite will hold for vacancies for which they expect few applicants. 
If this is correct, we expect that variables that increase the arrival rate 
of applicants, have a negative effect on the acceptance probability. 
Because the hazard rate is the product of the arrival rate and the 
acceptance probability, these effects may cancel, leaving the hazard rate 
(almost) unaffected. We need a structural model to disentangle the two 
effects. 
The estimates show that there is positive duration dependence. More 
specifically, the hazard rate is small during the first two weeks, 
increases by 50% in the next two weeks, is multiplied by a factor 6.6 in 
the iollowing month, and is doubled again in the subsequent period. Note 
also that there is strong evidence of unobserved heterogeneity. The 16% of 
the vacancies that correspond to v2 have a hazard that is 1/16 of the 
vx-type hazard. Neglecting this would cause a downward bias in the 
estimated regression coefficients (Ridder (1988)). 
We also estimated a reduced form model for the number of (rejected) 
applicants at the date of the first interview. The likelihood is based on 
the conditional distribution of N(t:) given tj (see (3.5)). We also 
included unobserved heterogeneity as in (5.2), and we assumed that v is 
independent of tx. The arrival rate of applicants is specified as 
4 
(5.6) Mt |x ,v) = exp{T 'x+kr iJ fc(t)+v} 
and the time-varying dummy variables Jfc(t), k=l,...,4 indicate 2-4 weeks, 
1-2 months, 2-3 months and 3+ months. The results in Table 5.2 show that 
the arrival rate of applicants rises with the required level of education 
and decreases with the required experience. Part-time jobs and jobs which 
have been advertised attract more applicants. Establishments with a 
personnel department also have more applicants. The duration dependence in 
the arrival rate has an interesting form. It is large during the first two 
weeks, and jumps to zero after this first period, to increase slightly 
after two months. This implies that almost all applicants arrive during the 
first two weeks of the vacancy. Figure 5.1 shows that this conclusion could 
have been reached by inspection of the data. This observation has 
implications for the estimation and interpretation of the structural model 
of section 3. 
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5.2 A Structural Model of Vacancy Durations 
In this section we shall consider the estimation of a structural model 
along the lines of section 3. In section 3 we assumed that the applicants 
arrived sequentially and that they were screened at the time of arrival, 
i.e. the employer accepted or rejected the applicant instantaneously. 
However applicants may not arrive sequentially and screening usually takes 
time. To be specific we assume that the employer advertises the vacancy and 
that this results in a pool of applicants of size N. These applicants 
arrive shortly after the advertisement. Next the employer sereens these 
applicants and selects a suitable employee. Let us assume that it takes a 
period S to select this employee. This period may differ between firms. If 
employers use this strategy, then we expect that the arrival rate of 
applicants is large during the first weeks of the vacancy. Moreover, the 
acceptance probability is small, because it takes time to screen the 
applicants. In the subsequent weeks the arrival rate of applicants becomes 
small, and the vacancy hazard reflects the speed of selection of a suitable 
employee from the pool of applicants. 
This interpretation is in line with the estimates of the duration 
dependence in the vacancy hazard and the arrival rate of (rejected) 
applicants: the rate at which applicants are hired is small during the 
first 4 weeks and the arrival rate of applicants becomes small after the 
first 2 weeks. In Table 5.3 we give these rates for the average vacancy, 
i.e. for the vacancy with the average characteristics of Table 4.1. To see 
the implications for the estimation of the duration dependence we note that 
the arrival rate of applicants in the structural model is equal to 
(5.7) m(t) = 0(t) + fi(t) 
and the acceptance probability is equal to 
From Table 5.3 we see that the estimated acceptance probability for the 
average vacancy is virtually 0 during the first 2 weeks, and is large 
during the next 2.5 months. The arrival rate of applicants is large during 
the first 2 weeks, is virtually 0 during the next 2 weeks, and gradually 
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increases during the next 2 months. After 3 months the arrival rate 
corresponds to a rate of about 2 applicants per rnonth. These results are at 
odds with a sequential search model. They strongly suggest that employers 
use a non-sequential search strategy. Most applicants arrive in the first 
two weeks after the vacancy is posted. For the next 2.5 months few new 
applicants arrive. Hiring is intense during the second and the third month 
of the vacancy (32% and 36% of all vacancies are filled in these periods). 
After 3 months 76% of all vacancies are filled. Also after 3 months we 
observe an increase in the arrival rate of applicants to about 2 per month. 
The acceptance probability of these applicants is about .6. Almost all 
vacancies are filled by the fifth month. 
We conclude that most vacancies are filled by applicants who arrived 
shortly after the beginning of the vacancy. The estimates also suggest that 
it takes 1-2 months to select a suitable new employee from the pool of 
applicants. The other 24% of the vacancies may be filled using a sequential 
search strategy. The relatively high acceptance probability guarantees that 
almost all vacancies are filled after 5 months. 
In Table 5.4 we distinguish vacancies by the level of education that is 
required by the employers. Broadly the same picture emerges as for the 
average vacancy. Note that only 10% of all vacancies that require a lower 
vocational training are filled after the third month. This fraction is 20% 
and 28% for vacancies that require an intermediate or higher level of 
education. Note also that the initial pool of applicants is larger for 
vacancies that require a higher level of education. However, it takes more 
time to select a suitable employee from this pool. The acceptance 
probabilities show that the higher the required level of education the 
smaller is the fraction of acceptable applicants after 3 months. These 
results suggests that at the lower level employers need relatively little 
time to hire a suitable applicant from a relatively small initial pool, and 
that almost all employees are hired from this pool. At the higher 
educational level employers need more time to select a suitable employee 
from a larger pool of applicants. Fewer employees are hired from this pool 
which may be caused by relatively high standards in the evaluation of 
applicants at higher educational levels. These high standards are also used 
in evaluating applicants that arrive after the first three months, and this 
results in relatively small acceptance probabilities of these applicants. 
Most empirical research of the search behaviour of the unemployed 
suggests that unemployment is due to lack of job offers. Our results show 
that vacancies are not the result of a lack of applicants. Most vacancies 
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are filled within 2.5 months after the arrival of a pool of applicants just 
after the beginning of the vacancy. Hence for most vacancies the vacancy 
duration is a selection period. If we thus reconsider the estimates of 
Table 5.1, we conclude that the selection period for commercial vacancies 
is relatively short, and that it takes more time to select a suitable 
employee if the required work experience is large and if the selection 
procedure includes a psychological test. From the second column of Table 
5.1 we see that the length of the selection period decreases with the 
number of applicants, i.e. it takes less time to select an employee from a 
large pool of applicants than it takes to select an employee from a small 
pool of applicants. Because we have included a number of regressors that 
affect the number of applicants (see Table 5.2), we can interpret the 
coëfficiënt as the effect of a deviation between the expected and the 
realized number of applicants. If the number of applicants is smaller than 
expected the employer may resort to sequential search which takes more 
time. Without information on the date of arrival of the successful 
applicant we can not investigate this possibility. However, this effect may 
explain the procyclical variation of the vacancy duration as documented in 
van Ours and Ridder (1989). In periods of high unemployment the large 
number of applicants reduces the average vacancy duration, and the opposite 
holds in periods of low unemployment. 
Note that we can also reinterpret the estimates in Table 5.2. The 
Poisson model estimated in that table can be seen as a Poisson regression 
for the size of the initial pool of applicants. 
6. Conclusion 
It is tempting to treat unemployment and vacancies symmetrically: the 
unemplöyed are looking for a job, and firms with one or more vacancies are 
looking for employees. Our results show that search by the unemplöyed is 
different from search by firms. Employer search is mostly non-sequential. 
Employers advertise a vacancy, and thereby form a pool of applicants. 
Almost all applicants arrive shortly after the announcement of the vacancy 
and most vacancies are filled within the next 2.5 months, a period during 
which few new applicants arrive. After that period employers may resort to 
sequential search, but our data are not conclusive in this respect. Hence, 
most vacancies do not exist because there are no applicants, but because it 
takes time to select a suitable employee from the available applicants. In 
other words, vacancy durations are mostly selection periods, and modelling 
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vacancy durations means modelling the selection of an employee from a pool 
of heterogeneous applicants. In a companion paper (van Ours and Ridder 
(1990)) we pursue this point. More specifically, we study the role of job 
requirements in the selection process. 
In the present paper we find that selection from a (unexpectedly) large 
pool of applicants is easier than selection from a (unexpectedly) small pool. 
Hence, if a given number of unemployed individuals searches with a low 
intensity we shall see few applicants and long selection periods (vacancy 
durations). This is in line with the finding of Jackman, Layard and Pissarides 
(1989) that the average vacancy duration has increased for a given level of 
unemployment (duration), because the unemployed search with a lower intensity. 
An alternative explanation is that employers now find it more difficult to 
select a suitable employee from the same number of applicants as before, 
because jobs have become more specialized. Without knowledge of the cyclical 
variation of the number of applicants we can not distinguish between these 
hypotheses. 
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Notes 
1) Mortensen (1986) is an excellent survey of job search theory. 
2) For an introduction into hazard models see Kiefer (1989). 
3) Exceptions are Narendranathan and Nickell (1986) and Van den Berg 
(1990). 
4) Renes (1989) and van Ours (1989) also use the OSA data. 
5) It is interesting to note that this number is larger for small (<10 
employees) firms, 74%, than for mediumsized (10-49 employees) and large 
(>49 employees), 65% and 46% respectively. Large firms have a more 
predictible outflow of employees and more possibilities for advance hiring. 
Note also that we report percentages of the stock of vacancies and that a 
larger fraction of the vacancies that are filled in a specific period may 
still be occupied at the time of hiring. 
6) There is a substantial variation in these numbers with the required 
level of education and the type of job (van Ours and Ridder (1989)). 
Furthermore, the variation in the vacancy duration in relation to the 
variation in the unemployment duration may be more interesting than the 
order of magnitude (Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Jackman, Layard and 
Pissarides (1984)). 
7) Van den Berg (1990) gives sufficiënt conditions for this effect to be 
positive. 
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Table 3.1. Sample means of some vacancy characteristics. 
Type of job; 
Commercial 
Industry2' 
Required education 
(minimal level): 
LBO 
MBO 
HBO/University 
Required experience: 
Minimal experience (years/10) 
Recruitment channels 
(at lst interview): 
Advertisement 
Labor exchange notified 
Job characteristics: 
Psychological test 
Part-time job 
Characteristics of 
establishment: 
Number of employees(/1000) 
Personnel department 
Vacancy duration: 
Incomplete duration at 
first interview (months) 
Number of applicants: 
Number of applicants at 
first interview 
N=496 N=174 N=670 
Filled at Open at Total 
2nd survey 2nd survey 
.48 .27 .42 
.23 .31 .26 
.23 .16 .21 
.42 .36 .41 
.29 .51 .34 
1.45 
1.82 
12.1 
2.08 
2.53 
8.04 
1.62 
.59 .58 .59 
.31 .34 .31 
.25 .39 .29 
.09 .05 .08 
.39 .50 .44 
.65 .66 .65 
2.01 
11.1 
1) Service, clerical or commercial job, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
job classification codes 3,4,5. 
2) Industry job, CBS job classification codes 6,7. 
3) Types of education (no. of years needed for graduation): 
LBO: Lower vocational and lower level general education (9) 
MBO: Intermediate vocational and mtermediate general education (12) 
HBO/University: Higher vocational education and university (15/18) 
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Table 5.1. F'arameter estimates reduced form model vacancy hazard [Standard 
errors) 
Type of job: 
Commercial .41 (.128) .40 (.129) 
Industry -.30 (.188) -.33 (.193) 
Required education 
(minimal level): 
Lower vocational .16 (.251) .14 (.256) 
Intermediate vocational -.19 (.260) -.22 (.265) 
Higher vocational/ -.38 (.283) -.40 (.288) 
university 
Required experience: 
Minimal experience 
(months/10) -.11 (.042) -.11 (.043) 
Recruitment channels 
(at lst interview): 
Advertisement .17 (.105) .13 (.107) 
Labor exchange notified -.090 (.118) -.091 (.120) 
Job characteristics: 
Psychological test -.28 (.128) -.28 (.130) 
Part-time job .023 (.192) .019 (.193) 
Characteristics of 
establishment: 
Number of employees (/1000) -.048 (.075) -.036 (.076) 
Personnel department .011 (.117) -.008 (.118) 
Duration effects: 
2-4 weeks .46 (.905) .41 (.893) 
1-2 months 1.91 (.872) 1.84 (.851) 
2-3 months 2.71 (.919) 2.69 (.908) 
3-4 months 2.78 (.927) 2.78 (.919) 
4-5 months 2.95 (.929) 2.87 (.921) 
5-6 months 3.05 (.931) 3.07 (.922) 
6+ months 2.59 (.930) 2.61 (.921) 
Heterogeneity: 
Vi -2.33 (.933) -2.34 (.918) 
Vj-Va 
-2.80 (.396) -2.78 (.375) 
r -1.59 (.529) -1.46 (.473) 
Applicants: — .032 (.014) 
Number of applicants(/10) 
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Table 5.2 Parameter estimates reduced form model applicant arrival rate 
(standard errors) 
Type of job: 
Commercial 
Industry 
.45 
.22 
(.041) 
(.047) 
Required education 
(minimal level): 
Lower vocational 
Intermediate vocational 
Higher vocational/ 
university 
.53 
.73 
.73 
(.102) 
(.099) 
(.104) 
Required experience: 
Minimal experience (months/10) -.027 (.012) 
Recruitment channels 
(at Ist interview): 
Advertisement 
Labor exchange notified 
.91 
-.053 
(.056) 
(.041) 
Job characteristics: 
Psychological test 
Part-time job 
-.034 
.36 
(.039) 
(.052) 
Characteristics of 
establishment: 
Number of employees (/1000) 
Personnel department 
-.057 
.51 
(.027) 
(.039) 
Duration effects: 
2-4 weeks 
1-2 months 
2-3 months 
3+ months 
-6.76 
-5.48 
-4.09 
-3.01 
(3.04) 
(2.45) 
(1.56) 
(.183) 
Heterogeneity: 
Va-Vt 
r 
.68 
-1.89 
-1.15 
(.108) 
(.029) 
(.096) 
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Table 5.3 Vacancy hazard and arrival rate of rejected applicants of 
''average' vacancy] implied acceptance probability, applicant 
arrival rate, fraction of vacancies remaining, and probability of 
hiring. 
Time period 0(t) /z(t) P(t) m(t) S(t)1} f(t)2) 
0-2 weeks .0163 3.89 .004 3.91 - .03 
2 -4 weeks .0258 .00451 .85 .0303 .97 .05 
1-2 months .107 .0162 .87 .123 .92 .32 
2 -3 months .233 .0651 .87 .298 .60 .36 
3-4 months .250 .192 .57 .442 .24 .15 
4 - 5 months .268 .192 .58 .460 .09 .06 
5-6 months .327 .192 .63 .519 .03 .02 
6+ months .205 .192 .52 .397 .01 .01 
1) Fraction of 'average' vacancies remaining in indicated period. 
2) Fraction of 'average' vacancies filled in indicated period. 
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Table 5.4 Applicant arrival rate, acceptance probability, vacancies 
remaining, and probability of hiring by minimally required 
level of education. 
Time period 0-2 2-4 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6+ 
m{t) 
Lower voc. 
Interm. voc. 
Higher voc./ 
university 
P(t) 
Lower voc. 
Interm. voc. 
Higher voc./ 
university 
ƒ(*) 
Lower voc. 
Interm. voc. 
Higher voc./ 
university 
3.44 .0401 
4.19 .0305 
4.18 .0254 
.007 .90 
.004 .84 
.003 .81 
.04 .07 
.03 .05 
.03 .03 
.168 .400 
.126 .313 
.105 .265 
.92 .86 
.87 .78 
.84 .74 
.43 .36 
.34 .38 
.30 .36 
.537 .605 
.467 .479 
.416 .454 
.69 .72 
.46 .65 
.50 .55 
.08 .02 
.13 .05 
.17 .07 
.650 .473 
.511 .385 
.480 .379 
.74 .64 
.67 .56 
.57 .46 
.00 .00 
.02 .00 
.03 .01 
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Figure 5.1 Number of applicants at first interview by incomplete vacancy 
duration. 
14 
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